We examine the short-run and long-run price reaction of equity REIT 
Introduction
REITs primarily rely on external sources of funding for the financing of capital projects and asset acquisitions, as the REIT corporate structure is unique in that they have a relative inability to retain earnings due to the regulatory provision requiring a minimum 90% distribution of taxable income (Ooi, Ong, and Li 2010) . Therefore REITs initially finance growth with unsecured credit, utilizing a "bridge financing strategy" and then refinance the short term debt with a combination of public long-term bond debt or seasoned equity (Elayan, Meyer, and Li (2004) ). Credit lines also often act as a substitute for cash (Hardin, Highfield, Hill and Kelly, 2009 ) capable of funding up to 17% of assets (Hardin and Hill, 2011) and offering a form of insurance to REIT firms (Ooi, Wong, and Ong, 2011) . As a result, REITs subject themselves to frequent monitoring in the capital markets (Gosh, Chinmoy, Nag and Sirmans (1997) and Hardin and Hill (2008) ). This reliance on external financing has motivated many studies examining REIT capital structure, transparency, and financing decisions.
The literature points to credit ratings as a factor that broadly impacts external financing decisions and capital structure. REITs target debt levels to obtain credit ratings just above the investment grade cutoff point where clear differences in financing cost and length to maturity can be observed (Brown and Riddiough (2003) and Highfield, Roskelley and Zhao (2007) ), and REITs with banking relationships are more likely to have credit ratings (Hardin and Wu (2010) ).
Additionally, Campbell, Dodd, Hill and Kelly (2012 working paper) offer evidence that credit ratings are inversely related to dividend volatility and measures of financial constraints.
The credit rating literature of non-REIT firms supports the notion that rating agencies are information specialists. The research suggests that changes in ratings or rating announcements disseminate new information to shareholders, and have an effect both in the short-term and longterm on security prices and the firm's financing decisions.
1 Although the REIT literature is rich with studies documenting the significance of credit ratings in relation to financing decisions, to our knowledge the REIT literature is silent on studies examining the information content of credit ratings and performance.
Given the competing views of REIT transparency, our study contributes to the literature by empirically testing the pricing and volume reaction of REITs to changes in their long term or unsecured credit ratings, and measuring the shareholder wealth effects of these changes. We examine REIT returns before the rating action, at the time of the rating action, and following the rating action, and test the null hypothesis of no price reaction. Abnormal trading volume is also examined, as previous literature supports the notion that differential results can occur across returns and volume, and in some cases trading volume might be more informative.
We compare our results to previous studies that examine market reactions to credit rating changes across the broader U.S. equity market. Given the importance of credit ratings to the REIT sector, if REITs have informational transparency, then security pricing should adjust in the weeks or months prior to the announcement in anticipation of the event. As such, REITs should not exhibit a substantial stock price reaction to the announcement of credit rating changes. This study tests the null hypothesis of no price reaction surrounding a REIT's credit rating change.
We then test for systematic determinants impacting the magnitude of CARs produced as a result of these credit rating changes.
Collectively, the findings suggest that credit rating changes appear to be anticipated, however not fully. Particularly in the case of credit rating downgrades, credit rating changes seem to disseminate some new information to market participants. While news of credit rating upgrades appears to be more transparent. Additionally, an analysis of the magnitude of REIT abnormal returns on possible explanatory variables points towards dividends as being a significant moderating variable.
From a trading volume perspective, consistent with the return analysis, credit rating downgrades result in higher trading activity compared to credit rating upgrades. This asymmetric response could be caused by a lack of pricing consensus among individual investors at the time of a credit downgrade announcement, a potential result of firm management concealing negative news and their willingness to release positive news leading up to rating actions as suggested by Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2009) .
The implications of our findings generally support the contention that REITs are relatively informationally transparent. In circumstances where the indications of REIT transparency are less strong, e.g., credit rating downgrades, they are still stronger than has been found in prior studies of this condition in non-REIT stocks subsequent Regulation Fair Disclosure.
Background Literature

Stock Reaction
Research on the broader US equity market shows that corporate credit rating downgrades and negative Credit Watch announcements affect stock prices negatively. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) examine the common stock price reaction to bond rating changes and Credit Watch announcements and find evidence of a stock price response to all events except an actual rating upgrade. Their findings are similar to Griffin and Sanvincente (1982) in that bond downgrades result in significant price reactions while bond upgrades do not produce a significant reaction.
Jorian, Liu and Shi (2005) offer evidence that the time period studied may have an impact on this differential. The authors study the change in the information content of ratings announcements pre-and post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). They contend that because post-Reg FD, rating agencies have access to inside information that cannot be disclosed to other analysts, the information content (i.e. stock price effect) will be more profound post-Reg FD. Indeed, they find that the stock prices react in greater magnitude to downgrades following Reg FD than previously reported, and, now rating upgrades have a positive and statistically significant impact on stock prices. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) examine the long-run stock returns following bond ratings changes, using Moody's bond rating changes from the 1970 to 1997 time period. They find limited abnormal performance for upgrades, but statistically significant negative abnormal returns of 10 to 14% in the year subsequent to a downgrade. Thus, they conclude the market does not fully anticipate the negative implications of downgrades for future profitability. The authors suggest that information processing bias like optimism can lead to erroneous conclusions when applied to downgrades resulting in subsequent adjustments in stock prices. It is unclear why investors react asymmetrically, with downgrades generally producing a stronger reaction than upgrades in non-REIT firms. Ederington and Goh (1998) suggest that the observed asymmetric market response is because firms voluntarily release good news to the public but rely on credit rating agencies to release negative or unfavorable information. Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2009) , in a study corporate dividend changes and management earnings forecasts, suggest that a greater amount of news is impounded in stock prices prior to good news announcements relative to bad news, and therefore the authors conclude that good news tends to be leaked to the market. These findings are consistent with the survey evidence collected in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) , as managers have strong incentives to withhold bad news and chance that the firm's economic condition improves prior to the required news disclosure.
Trading Volume Reaction
Trading volume reflects investors' activity by summing all investors' trades, while security returns reflect an aggregation of investors' activity. Therefore, returns may be less sensitive than trading volume to the information content of credit events. Increased volume reflects a lack of consensus regarding the price, induced by information discovery. This lack of consensus regarding the price leads to increased trading activity that may be counterbalancing from a price perspective (Beaver 1968) . Bamber and Cheon (1995) find that although price and volume reactions are on average positively related to earnings announcements, the relationship is weaker than expected. Their findings generally support those of Kim and Verrecchia (1991) that when an announcement generates a differential belief among investors, trading volume is often high.
This differential belief is caused by varying degrees of precision in private information.
REIT transparency
The notion of transparency in the REIT literature is a source of debate. Damodaran, John, and Liu (1997) and Hardin and Hill (2008) ) attribute REIT transparency to the regulatory provision requiring REIT's to distribute 90% of taxable income. This provision limits REIT management's ability to access discretionary income, and requires REITs to fund growth through accessing external capital markets. Gentry Kemsley and Meyer (2003) argue that the value of a REIT is simply the aggregate fair market value of its assets, making the valuation of REITs relatively transparent. Similarly, Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2005) and Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2008) suggest that equity REITs are relatively simple to value because they hold portfolios of tangible assets and have a transparent structure. Higgins, Ott and Van Ness (2006) (Hand et al. 1992) . Figure 1 plots the yearly numbers of upgrades and downgrades over the period, showing that these generally move in tandem for the two types of debt notes. Table 1 presents these yearly numbers by rating agency.
Standard and Poor's and Moody's are the most active agencies with a combined 64% share of all rating actions and 71% share of all rating changes Please Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 Our sample of 241 U.S. REIT rating changes (upgrades/downgrades) is then reduced to filter out redundant actions, actions whose effect is contaminated by other announcements, and cases where we do not have all necessary daily returns. 2 Similarly to Dichev and Piotroski (2001) we only retain the event that occurs first if the rating actions for the same firm's long-term and senior unsecured debt are announced within a four-day window. We use an additional filter where the information content of credit rating announcements may be contaminated by other firm-specific news (i.e. earnings announcements, dividend distributions, mergers and acquisitions activity, debt retirements). We consider an announcement contaminated where any firm-specific substantial price-relevant news event is detected by Lexis-Nexis within a three-day window surrounding the day of a rating action. Additionally, our analysis requires the availability of daily price returns, to calculate abnormal returns during our estimation window.
The sample of US REIT credit rating upgrades and downgrades during January 2000 to December 2009 is accordingly reduced from 241 to 108. The filtering process resulted in approximately 55% data loss.
The remaining sample consists of 61 credit rating upgrades (60 pre-estimation time period) and 48 credit rating downgrades, totaling 109 U.S. equity REIT rating changes. Tables 2 and 3 describe the sample rating changes by year and agency, and magnitude. Consistent with Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao (2007) and Campbell, Dodd, Hill, and Kelly (WP 2012) , the BBB-to BBB+ rating level appears to be the most active containing 34% of the changes. A rating level change (e.g., BB-to B+) occurred in 37% of the observation.
Shareholder wealth effects
In this Section we explain the methods employed and present the results of the tests measuring abnormal returns during 'windows' that (1) are contemporaneous with the credit rating announcement date, (2) precede the credit event, and (3) follow the credit event. We also explain the method used in the analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (CARS), as we check for systematic firm-specific explanatory variables
Abnormal returns in contemporaneous credit rating announcement windows
We begin by examining the impact of credit rating actions as reflected in REIT stock price movements surrounding a credit announcement event: specifically, the extent of any abnormal return (AR) during an announcement window(s). We adopt the market model event study methodology as established by Warner (1980, 1985) , to estimate a firms abnormal return on each day of the announcement event window. We then aggregate the daily abnormal returns to produce the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for that window. We do this for four The abnormal returns for event j are thus calculated as:
∑ where d represents each day of the event window, R jt is the actual daily return for the firm and R jmt is the market return over the event's estimation period. The market return is estimated using the CRSP value-weighted and the CRSP Ziman REIT value-weighted indices as the market proxy. We estimate the model parameters α j and β j using an estimation window beginning on Day +60 with a maximum estimation length of 315 trading days. 4 In setting our estimation window to follow the rating change, we take into account previous research that has shown downgrades tend to occur after other bad news and when the firm's stock price has performed poorly (Ederington and Goh 1998). 5 As a robustness measure, we also examine a pre-event estimation window beginning on Day -375 with an estimation length of 315 days. After calculating event CARs, we then calculate and report the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). Where, the CAAR is the arithmetic average of all sample event CARs.
In addition to the equally-weighted CAAR, we also calculate the precision-weighted CAAR (PWCAAR). The PWCAAR weights each event's CAR in inverse proportion to the variability in their prediction errors. The Patell (1976) test is used when the PWCAAR is reported and represents a standardized abnormal return test that estimates a separate standard error for each credit event. The t-statistic used when calculating the significance of CAARs equally weights the observations, limiting the CAAR model to assuming constant error variance across event CARs.
The PWCAAR accounts for the possibility of a non-constant error variance across different event CARs. However, the t-statistic used in CAAR is robust to cross-sectional dependence, which may be problematic for the Patell test. Both the Patell and t-statistic test the same hypothesis that the population parameter mean is equal to zero; however, the weights applied to the observations may differ.
The nonparametric generalized sign test was also conducted using the normal approximation to the binomial distribution as described by Cowan (1992) . The generalized sign test compares the fraction of positive abnormal returns during the event period with the fraction obtained during the estimation period. The null hypothesis is that these fractions are the same.
The results for the CAAR, PWCAAR and generalized sign test using both the CRSP valueweighted index and the CRSP Ziman value-weighted are shown in Tables 4 and 5 . In this study, we generally do not observe a significant stock market reaction to upgrades across the contemporaneous event windows when we use the CRSP value-weighted index as the market proxy. For upgrades, the two-day (0, +1) CAAR is not statistically significant at -0.05% and 0.07% respectively for the post and pre estimation event time periods. The PWCAAR is also not statistically significant having parameter estimates of -0.19% and -0.07%. Furthermore, the nonparametric generalized sign test did not detect an abnormal number of positive market adjusted returns, based on the respective estimation periods.
When we substitute the CRSP value-weighted index with the sector specific CRSP Ziman REIT value-weighted index we find that the parameter estimates in the two-day (0, +1) CAAR remain insignificant, however the four-day (-1, +1) CAAR window becomes statistically significant. The
PWCAARs also remain insignificant in the two-day (0, +1) window, but four-day (-1, +1)
CAAR window becomes significant in the pre-estimation analysis.
Please insert Figure 3 and Table 4 For downgrades, when examining CAAR's using the CRSP value-weighted market index as the market proxy in the post estimation period analysis, we only find a significant market reaction in one of the four event windows: the (0, +2) CAAR. An analysis of the PWCAARs and the nonparametric generalized sign revealed no statistically significant market reactions to credit rating downgrades in the post estimation period analysis. When the pre-estimation model specification is considered, credit rating downgrades generally produce negative and significant CAARs ranging from 0.18% to -2.03%.
Please insert Table 5 and Figure 3
From a REIT pricing perspective when using a broad market index, credit rating announcements generally do not appear to disseminate new information to the market suggesting that REITs appear to be relatively transparent in this regard. After adjusting the model to include a REIT sector market proxy, credit announcements appear to disseminate some new information to market participants, particularly credit downgrades. These results suggest that the CAAR and PWCAAR parameter estimates are moderately sensitive to model specifications with regards to the market proxy, and timing of the estimation period. Models calculating α j and β j based on the pre-estimation window and those that include the REIT Ziman index as a market proxy tended to produce larger and more significant coefficients. The economic effect of this information content remains marginal, the average CAAR and PWCAAR coefficient produced across our upgrade sample is 0.23% while the downgrade sample produced and average coefficient of -0.81% across the 32 CAAR and PWCAAR windows.
Abnormal returns in windows preceding the credit rating announcement
The credit ratings of REITs have a real effect on the cost of capital; therefore if REITs are transparent then we would expect to find a stock price reaction prior to the credit change announcement. We examine windows for 3 months, 6 months and 1 year prior to the announcement by using calendar-time regression to estimate the abnormal returns. For each window, we construct daily portfolios composed of firms that have an announcement event that follows within the specified window period (3 months, 6 months, 1 year). We calculate the return series for the portfolios and then regress the excess of this return over the risk-free rate against the Fama-French (1993) risk factors, using the CRSP value-weighted market index return R mt,,
'small-minus-big' market capitalization factor SMB,'high-minus-low' market-to-book ratio factor HML, and Carhart's (1997) momentum factor UMB. We also substitute the CRSP valueweighted market index with the CRSP Ziman REIT value-weighted index as the market proxy.
The model is: We find significant positive abnormal returns for upgrades in all three time periods, with the magnitude greatest three and six months prior to the announcement. When examining downgrades, the coefficients are generally negative with the one-year preannouncements periods producing significant abnormal returns. These results provide evidence supportive of the contention that investors anticipate credit rating changes and trade accordingly. Table 6 4
Please insert
.3 Abnormal returns in windows following the credit rating announcement
Research suggests that focusing on only a short return window may be incomplete as stock prices may under-react to firm-specific announcements, adjusting to new market information over an extended time horizon. 6 We therefore test the long-run performance of REITs following rating changes by again estimating WLS and OLS calendar-time regression models, using six months, one year and two years as the periods for construction of the calendar-time portfolios.
The WLS and OLS calendar-time regression model results reveal evidence of abnormal returns of REITs following upgrades, but not downgrades. The economic magnitude of abnormal returns following upgrades range from 0.50% to 0.90% a month across the time horizons, with the one year time period producing the largest impact. The abnormal returns for downgrades are statistically insignificant across the three holding periods, and are robust to the methodology employed. These results when taken in combination with the previous short-run performance findings suggest that although credit events are anticipated, market participants still seem to under-react to the long-run benefits of positive credit rating changes, possibly due to conservatism (Griffin and Tversky 1992; Edwards 1968) . Results are presented in Table 7 .
Please insert Table 7 4
.4 Summary of Shareholder Wealth Effects of Credit Rating Changes
In summary, we find positive abnormal performance preceding a credit upgrade announcement and negative abnormal performance preceding a credit downgrade announcement. In the window covering the day the credit rating change was announced and the day immediately subsequent we generally do not find a significant reaction for upgrades, but do find statistically significant negative reactions to downgrades. For the 12-month time period following the announcement we find statistically significant positive abnormal returns for upgrades. Downgrades generally produce negative coefficients, but they lack statistical significance at conventional levels.
Section 5. Determinants of CARS
We employ an OLS regression model to examine the relationship between abnormal returns and a set of potential firm-specific variables. The selection of control variables is based on prior literature. We obtain accounting data including market capitalization, total assets, total debt, net where, the selection of firm specific variables employed in the CAR analysis is based on prior empirical findings. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that larger firms' managers are less bounded by shareholders' discipline due to less governing power of shareholders in larger companies, therefore we control for firm size (lnSIZE). Debt ratio (DebtR) is controlled for to examine Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory. This theory contends that managers make better investment decisions when the firm has more debt, since less free cash flow makes management less likely to waste resources. Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006) contend that operating performance may affect firm value; we control for operating performance prior to the announcement of a credit rating change from the income (NIR) and expense (ExpR) perspectives.
Similarly, Bauer, Eicholtz, and Kok (2010) find that shareholders of firms with high payout ratios are less likely to benefit from greater corporate governance, we control for this through the inclusion of dividends scaled by shares (DivPS). While, Hartzell, Sun and Titman (2006) find that institutional investors play a significant monitoring role for REIT shareholders, and Chung and Jo (1996) find that the number of security analysts following a firm is positively related to the market value of the firm. Therefore, REIT institutional holdings are controlled for using INST and the number of analysts that forecast the performance for a REIT is controlled for using ANALY. (2009) and Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) that firm management may be incentivized to conceal bad news from the market until disclosure is required. The remaining parameter estimates related to operating performance generally have the expected sign, but do not significantly explain REIT CARs in our sample.
Please insert Table 9 6. REIT Trading Volume
We examine the impact of credit rating actions as reflected in trading volume movements surrounding a credit announcement event by estimating the log-transformed volume of each security in our sample, following the methodology of Campbell and Wasley (1993) . This is carried out in a similar fashion to the abnormal return model, except the log-transformed volume replaces the security total return. Trading volume models have been shown to be powerful tests of the information content contained in earnings announcements.
The trading volume models are estimated using the percentage of outstanding shares traded on the CRSP value-weighted market index. We calculate the cumulative abnormal trading volume These results are reported in Table 10 . We observe a significant positive trading volume reaction to credit downgrades. This is likely the result of a lack of precision in preannouncement information, as firms prefer to guard negative information contributing to a lack of pricing consensus, Kim and Verrecchia (1991) . We find credit upgrades exhibit a weaker influence on investors' trades. This suggests that some investors may treat credit upgrades as a confirming event and thus are less inclined to adjust their portfolio.
Please Insert Table 10
Conclusion
This study provides additional insight into the information content of REIT credit ratings, and the degree of REIT transparency. Principally, this study examines the price reaction of REIT shares during 'windows' that are contemporaneous with the credit rating announcement date, precede the credit rating change, and subsequent the credit rating change. We also search for informational asymmetry in the REIT industry by examining the relationship between the magnitude of the price reaction resulting from a credit rating change and a set of potential firmspecific variables.
In the short-run, for upgrades, we find no substantial evidence of abnormal returns immediately following credit rating changes when using the CRSP value-weighted index as the market proxy, consistent with the notion of REIT transparency. When the sector specific CRSP Ziman REIT index is substituted as the market proxy we find limited evidence of abnormal returns immediately surrounding credit rating changes, however economically this reaction is substantially less than the reaction found in prior studies examining the broader U.S. equity market (e.g., Jorian Liu and Shi (2005)). From both an abnormal return and trading volume perspective, downgrades generally produce a stronger reaction than upgrades both statistically and economically.
The analysis of CARs surrounding credit rating changes reveals that the amount of dividends per share attenuates the stock price reaction to credit rating changes, complementing evidence found in prior research. This finding suggest that credit rating changes have a lower impact on firms paying high dividends, at least at the time of the announcement.
When we examine the time period preceding a rating change we find superior abnormal returns in all three time horizons (three-months, six-months and one-year) for upgrades suggesting positive information is being absorbed into equity pricing. When downgrades are examined we find evidence of negative abnormal returns in the six-month and one-year time periods preceding a rating downgrade. From a pricing perspective, a substantial amount of information content contained in credit rating changes appears to disseminate to market participants prior to the official credit rating change news release, as the stock price adjust in the months leading up to the event.
We also examine the long-run performance of REITs subsequent to rating changes and find significant monthly abnormal returns for firms with upgrades for up to two years. We find no significant abnormal performance for downgrades. These findings when taken in combination with the short-run performance results indicate that although anticipated, investors tend to undervalue the effect of a positive credit rating change, perhaps due to conservatism (Griffin and Tversky 1992; Edwards 1968) , and consequently the stock price continues to adjust in the tested post announcement time periods.
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The excess returns are presented in the table with the associated test-statistic in parenthesis. *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test. Fama-French (1993) risk factors and momentum using the CRSP value weighted market index return and the CRSP Ziman REIT value-weighted index return (R mt ) ,small-minus-big market capitalization factor SMB, high-minus-low market-to-book ratio factor HML, and momentum UMB.. The excess returns for portfolio p are calculated as:
( ) The excess returns are presented in the table with the associated test-statistic in parenthesis. *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test. Notes: CAR is two-day (days 0, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for an equally balanced portfolio around the event announcement; lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; DebtR is the debt ratio of the total debt divided by total assets of the firm at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; NIR is the firm's net income divided by the total asset at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; ExpR is the operating expense divided by the total asset at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; DivPS is the dividends per share; INST is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total number of outstanding shares at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; ANALY is the number of analysts to forecasts of FFO for REITs at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement. Notes: CAR is two-day (days 0, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for an equally balanced portfolio around the event announcement; Downgrades is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an event is a downgrade and 0 otherwise; lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; DebtR is the debt ratio of the total debt divided by total assets of the firm at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; NIR is the firm's net income divided by the total asset at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; ExpR is the operating expense divided by the total asset at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; DivPS is the dividends per share; INST is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total number of outstanding shares at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; ANALY is the number of analysts to forecasts of FFO for REITs at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; IntDnDebtR is the interaction between Downgrades and DebtR; IntDnExpR is the interaction between Downgrades and ExpR. *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
